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THE POWER OF THE WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARK:
COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER ARTICLE 6BIS OF THE
PARIS CONVENTION AN INTEGRATED PART OF
SECTION 44 OF THE LANHAM ACT
Brandon Barker
Abstract: The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property outlines
important international trademark principles for its signatory nations, including the United
States. Specifically, article 6bis of the Paris Convention creates the well-known marks
doctrine, a provision that allows foreign owners of well-known trademarks to bring
infringement actions against citizens of other member nations using the same or similar trade
names. Such foreign trademark holders can assert these rights regardless of whether their
mark is directly used or registered in the native country of the alleged infringer. Although the
Paris Convention provides a list of trademark rights within its articles, the convention itself is
not self-executing and thus requires enacting legislation to give full legal effect to its
principles. With the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, Congress effectively codified
federal trademark law and provided the sole statutory means by which trademark owners can
assert their substantive rights in federal courts. The Lanham Act does not explicitly reference
article 6bis, but it does strive to give full effect to the provisions of international conventions
in order to afford foreign nationals protection from unfair competition. This Comment argues
that a proper statutory construction of the Lanham Act requires that courts treat the well-
known marks doctrine as an incorporated, codified piece of federal trademark law. The plain
language of the Lanham Act, its legislative history, prior judicial considerations of relevant
provisions of the Act, and the Charming Betsy canon support the conclusion that the Lanham
Act integrates article 6bis and thus provides substantive rights for foreign well-known
trademark owners.
A long-standing foreign cigar manufacturer sells its product for over
forty years in its native country under the registered trademark
"COHIBA."' The cigar becomes internationally renowned and cigar
magazines with large circulations in the United States give it the highest
ranking possible.2 After this distinction becomes widely recognized in
the United States, an American manufacturer launches a new premium
cigar under the same trade name.3  The American company
acknowledges that its new line of cigars is named COHIBA at least
partly in response to the magazines' coverage of the foreign brand.4 The
1. Hypothetical based on Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir.
2005).
2. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 466.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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foreign manufacturer does not conduct direct sales in the U.S. and their
use of the COHIBA mark is not registered under federal trademark law.'
Can the foreign manufacturer assert any substantive rights in U.S. courts
to enjoin the American distributor from infringing on its well-known
trademark?
Courts have not conclusively resolved the issue of whether federal
law provides a means of protection for well-known foreign trademarks
unregistered in the U.S.6 The potential basis for such protection begins
with the well-known marks doctrine found in article 6bis of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention),7
an international treaty that dates back to 1883.8 The Paris Convention,
however, is not self-executing, and thus requires enacting legislation to
give effect to its articles.9 In 1946, Congress codified federal trademark
law with the passage of the Lanham Act.10 Although it does not
explicitly codify the Paris Convention's well-known marks doctrine,
section 44(b) of the Lanham Act provides that foreign claimants may be
entitled to benefits arising from international conventions to which their
native country and the U.S. are signatories.'1 Courts have struggled with
the Lanham Act when determining the extent to which it incorporates
the substantive rights included in such international conventions,
particularly article 6bis of the Paris Convention. 1
This Comment argues that U.S. courts should interpret the Lanham
Act as incorporating article 6bis of the Paris Convention in order to
provide trademark protections for qualified foreign litigants. The plain
language of sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham Act indicates that
federal trademark law codifies articles of the Paris Convention and
provides additional rights beyond those explicit in the Lanham Act.'
3
5. See id. at 465.
6. See id.; see also Grupo Gigante S.A. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo Gigante II), 391 F.3d 1088, 1094
(9th Cir. 2004); Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326-28
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); ITC v. Punchgini, 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
7. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
10. See Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
12. See, e.g., Grupo Gigante 11, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004); Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El
Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h)-(i); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua,
364
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The Lanham Act's legislative history further reveals that Congress
enacted the Act with a design toward executing the provisions of the
Paris Convention. 14 Although limited case law exists, both federal and
state courts have applied the well-known marks doctrine to provide
protection to foreign litigants through the language of section 44 of the
Lanham Act. 15 Courts have also attempted to interpret the Act in
accordance with the Charming Betsy canon, which requires that courts
interpret statutes in a manner that comports with international
obligations.' 6 Therefore, a proper statutory construction of the Lanham
Act should incorporate article 6bis of the Paris Convention.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Paris Convention, the well-
known marks doctrine, and the Lanham Act-the vehicle by which the
articles of the Paris Convention may be asserted in the U.S. Part II
provides an overview of the canons of statutory construction that courts
must follow in their interpretation of statutes. Part III analyzes the
Lanham Act's incorporation of international conventions in light of
applicable principles of statutory interpretation. Part IV argues that a
proper construction of the Lanham Act recognizes incorporation of the
well-known marks doctrine as a substantive right available to claimants
based on: (1) the plain language of the statute; (2) the legislative history
of the statute; (3) prior judicial interpretations of the statute; and (4) the
need to interpret the statute in accordance with international principles.
I. THE PARIS CONVENTION CREATES THE WELL-KNOWN
MARKS DOCTRINE BUT IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING
The establishment of the well-known marks doctrine took place in
1883 at the Paris Convention,1 7 a meeting of nations that served to create
the principal international treaty of trademark and unfair competition
law. 18 The U.S., as a signatory nation, explicitly recognized the well-
known marks doctrine by stipulating to article 6bis of the Paris
948 F. Supp. 684, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
14. See Trademarks: Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the H.
Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong. 164 (1939).
15. See Grupo Gigante 11, 391 F.3d at 1094; Vaudable v. Montmarte, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334-36
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
16. See In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909, 924 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
17. See Paris Convention, supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:74 (4th ed. 2005).
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Convention. 19 This article must be considered in accordance with the
principle of territoriality, the basic notion that trademark rights and
protections do not extend across international borders.2 ° Since the Paris
Convention is not a self-executing treaty and requires only reciprocal
treatment among member nations, the precepts espoused at Paris provide
trademark rights only to the extent that each country makes such
guidelines functional by enacting its own substantive legislation.21 In the
U.S., the Lanham Act serves as the implementing legislation.22 As a
result, foreign mark holders may receive protection for well-known
marks in federal courts only to the extent that the Lanham Act
recognizes article 6bis of the Paris Convention.23
A. The Well-Known Marks Doctrine Is an Integral Part of the Paris
Convention and Is Considered the Law of the U.S. to the Extent
Recognized by Statute
24
The U.S. is a signatory nation to the Paris Convention. Participating
nations held this international conference in order to develop a
framework for intellectual property protection. 25 The primary aim of the
Paris Convention was to create an agreement between the signatory
nations to provide reciprocal treatment with respect to intellectual
property rights.26 Thus, for example, citizens of France should receive
the same trademark rights in the U.S. that federal law provides American
citizens.27 The resulting articles that emerged from the Paris Convention,
and their subsequent amendments, 28 are considered the law of the U.S.
only to the extent that they are recognized by enacted federal law.2 9
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention specifically provides protection
for well-known marks across international borders when such marks are
19. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956).
20. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th
Cir. 1985).
21. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640-41.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 679 (3d Cir. 1989).
25. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.
26. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640.
27. See id. at 640-41.
28. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 29:22. The articles have been revised on six occasions
since their inception in 1883, most recently in Stockholm in 1967, and amended in 1979. Id.
29. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 641.
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"liable to create confusion" and are "used for identical or similar
goods., 30 Under the well-known marks doctrine, foreign nationals who
use their trademarks in other countries can, if their marks are sufficiently
famous, gain exclusive protection in the U.S. 31 This protection of well-
known marks is strengthened by article 1Obis, which provides that all
acts by competitors in any of the member nations that serve to create
trademark confusion or mislead the public about trademarked goods are
strictly prohibited.32
B. The Well-Known Marks Doctrine Can Be Interpreted Only in
Accordance with the Territoriality Principle
Protection of well-known marks must occur in conjunction with the
territoriality principle, a longstanding concept basic to trademark law.
33
The territoriality principle recognizes that trademark rights exist in a
particular country only in accordance with that nation's laws.34
Trademarks thus have a separate legal existence under each country's
laws. The primary concern, therefore, is the protection of the foreign
trademark owner from infringement by others who may use the same or
similar mark in domestic commerce. 35 The drafters of the Paris
Convention included the concept of territoriality in the treaty.36 Thus,
under the territoriality principle, priority of trademark rights in the U.S.
depends entirely on the development and use of the trademark in the
U.S.; consideration is not necessarily accorded to competing trademark
usage by foreigners.
37
30. Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis ("The countries of the Union undertake ... to
prohibit the use.., of a trademark... liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being
already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or
similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a
reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion . .
31. See Grupo Gigante H, 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004).
32. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. l0bis.
33. See, e.g., Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005).
34. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th
Cir. 1985).
35. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
36. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6(3) ("A mark duly registered in a country of the
Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union,
including the country of origin.").
37. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 29:2. But see id. § 29:1 (noting that the foundation of U.S.
trademark law embraced a universality theory, which asserted that trademarks lacked territorial
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:363, 2006
C. The Paris Convention Does Not Create Substantive Law for
Individual Nations and Enacting Legislation Is Needed to Give
Effect to Its Provisions
The Paris Convention does not create separate causes of action
distinct from those provided under U.S. law.3 s The treaty states that it is
not self-executing, 39 and federal courts have reached the same
conclusion.4 ° Its original aim was not to define unfair competition law
within the signatory nations, but rather to provide fundamental standards
that member countries would follow. 4' A foreign mark holder may in
certain instances receive protection from trademark infringement or
unfair competition in the U.S., but such protection must originate from
federal law.4 2 Thus, the articles of the Paris Convention are recognized
only to the extent that federal law has made them operative by enacting
legislation.4 3
D. The Lanham Act Provides the Statutory Means by Which U.S.
Courts Apply the Articles of the Paris Convention
Congress codified federal trademark law in 1946 by passing the
Lanham Act in order to provide federal protection for trademarks used in
bounds and were capable of extension to any and all markets where the mark had gained
recognition).
38. See Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Labs., Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 389 (9th Cir. 1959).
39. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 25 ("Any country party to this Convention undertakes
to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this
Convention.... It is understood that, at the time a country deposits its instrument of ratification or
accession, it will be in a position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this
Convention."); see also id. art. 17; French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427,
438-39 (1903); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir.
1979); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 29:33.
A minority of courts have indicated that the Paris Convention is self-executing and provides a
basis for a claim in federal court. See, e.g., Benard Indus. Inc. v. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1426 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int'l, Inc.,
612 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D. Fla. 1984). This debate is beyond the scope of this Comment, and the author
assumes that the treaty is not self-executing.
40. See, e.g., Int'l Cafr, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf& Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.5
(1 th Cir. 2001). But see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956)
(finding that the plaintiff may be correct in asserting that the Paris Convention is self-executing but
does not create private rights for acts occurring in foreign countries).
41. See lnt'l Caf , 252 F.3d at 1277-78.
42. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640-41.
43. See id.
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interstate and foreign commerce.44 The Lanham Act functions as the
federal enacting legislation of the Paris Convention.45 With its passage,
Congress attempted to correct what it determined to be a domestic
failure to enforce treaty obligations to protect intellectual property
rights.46 While the Lanham Act incorporates the Paris Convention, the
international treaty does not create substantive rights beyond those
independently provided in the federal statute.47 Instead, the Paris
Convention serves to enforce the principle that foreigners should be
provided the same trademark protection as signatory nations provide
their own citizens.48 Congress' intention in meeting international
obligations was to secure protection for U.S. trademark owners in
foreign countries.49
In sum, article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides protection for
foreign well-known mark holders. This protection, however, is limited
by the territorial nature of trademark rights and the fact that the Paris
Convention requires implementing legislation by signatory nations
because the convention itself is not self-executing. In the U.S., the
Lanham Act is the statutory mechanism by which the rights of the Paris
Convention are enforced.
44. See Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat, 427 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
46. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274,
1276.
47. See Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640.
48. See id.
49. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 1276; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i). While not within the scope of
this Comment, U.S. courts, prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, consistently provided redress
for foreign well-known mark holders. See Kerry v. Toupin, 60 F. 272, 272-73 (D. Mass. 1894)
(holding that a Canadian medicine manufacturer could bring a trademark infringement claim against
a U.S. competitor by virtue of the Paris Convention); see also Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co., 22
F.2d 721, 721-23 (5th Cir. 1927) (holding that a British fur trading company known in the U.S. for
two centuries was entitled to protection against a Texas fur business operating under the same
name); La Republique Franqaise v. Schultz, 57 F. 37, 38-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) (holding that a French
supplier of mineral water had a well-known trade name in the U.S. and could therefore enjoin a
New York supplier from using the same name); Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Rest. & Cafe, 288
N.Y.S. 529, 530-31, 537-38 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (enjoining a New York restaurateur from the continued
use of the same mark as a European restaurant chain that had developed worldwide goodwill
through its use).
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II. U.S. COURTS INTERPRET FEDERAL STATUTES USING
CERTAIN CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Courts use canons of statutory construction to determine the
legislative intent underlying particular statutory language.50 Courts begin
their analysis by looking to the plain meaning of statutory text.5' If the
text is ambiguous, courts may also consider the legislative history of the
statute52 as well as prior judicial decisions that have considered the
language at issue.53 Lastly, courts attempt to interpret ambiguous statutes
in a manner that gives full effect to relevant international
considerations.54
A. Courts Begin Statutory Analysis by Looking to the Plain Language
of a Statute
When interpreting statutes, federal courts begin with the language
enacted by Congress under the assumption that the plain meaning of
such language conveys the legislative purpose of the statute.5 Unless
there is alternatively expressed legislative intent or ambiguity, courts
will consider the ordinary meaning of the statutory language to be a
complete and final articulation of the statute.56 The meaning of a statute
may be unambiguous even where the application of the statute is in
dispute.57 Even if the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous,
however, courts may also consider the particular language employed in
the context of the entire statutory scheme, including other provisions of
the statute.58 In construing statutes, courts aim to give effect to every
clause and word within the statutory text, thereby avoiding situations
where certain words are rendered meaningless.59
50. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
51. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003).
54. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
55. See Am. Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 68.
56. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
57. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE -HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION iv (1989).
58. See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
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B. Ambiguous Statutory Language Requires Courts to Consider
Relevant Legislative History to Determine Congressional Intent
In situations where statutory language is unclear, courts will ascertain
the meaning of a particular provision by looking to its legislative
history.60 This investigation may include the circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the statute, the legislative policy that the statute was
designed to implement, and the statute's relationship to existing
principles governing the same general subject matter.61 For instance, in
NuPulse, Inc. v. Schlueter Co.,62 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit looked to the Lanham Act's legislative history to
determine whether the court should utilize common law or statutory
remedies when resolving a trademark claim for false designation of
origin after determining that the plain language of the Act was
ambiguous.63 The court first considered Congress' general intentions in
enacting the statute, and then examined a Senate report that spoke
directly to the issue at hand.64 The language of the Senate report
prompted the court to rule that statutory remedies best effectuate
Congressional intent.65 By ascertaining and then applying Congress'
will, courts can properly interpret otherwise unclear statutory language.
C. Courts May Also Consider Prior Judicial Constructions when
Analyzing the Meaning of Statutory Language
Courts may consider past judicial constructions of statutory text in
their interpretations of statutory language.66 Courts consider similar
judicial constructions of a given provision as one indication that its plain
language is clear.67 In instances of ambiguity, courts specifically
emphasize considerations of past judgments when a conflict arises as to
statutory construction because the legislature retains the power to
effectively overrule the decisions of the courts.68 In the trademark arena,
60. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
61. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728-29, 731-32, 734-37 (1975).
62. 853 F.2d 545 (7th Cir. 1988).
63. See id. at 548-50.
64. See id. at 550.
65. See id.
66. See Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Herrera, 289 F.3d 311, 320 (5th Cir. 2002).
67. See Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 455 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
68. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
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courts look to how other jurisdictions have tackled similar Lanham Act
claims, particularly those involving matters of first impression or limited
instances of litigation in the past.69 For example, in Davidoff& CIE, S.A.
v. PLD International Corp.,70 a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit looked successively to the plain language of the Lanham Act, its
legislative history, and then to sister circuit rulings addressing the same
issue in order to fashion a judgment under section 32 of the Act.71
D. Courts Follow the Charming Betsy Canon and Interpret
Ambiguous Statutory Language with an Emphasis on Meeting
International Commitments
Under the Charming Betsy canon, established in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 72  courts attempt to harmonize statutes with
international obligations when statutory ambiguity exists. 73 While
Congressional legislation is typically meant to apply only within the
U.S., 74 the Supreme Court has recognized extraterritorial application of
federal statutes when Congress provides affirmative language to that
effect.75 Acts of Congress will trump international law only when such
acts clearly conflict with international obligations and Congress passed
the act after the ratification of the international treaty.76 In all other
situations, courts continue to follow the Charming Betsy canon,
recognizing that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains,
77
even when the international agreement requires enacting legislation.
78
In Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court had to determine whether
69. See, e.g., Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1298-1302 (1 1th Cir.
2001); see also Maday v. Toll Bros. Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 599, 601-02 (ED. Va. 1999) (looking to
prior circuit and district court rulings as relevant authority in deciding a Lanham Act statutory
construction issue).
70. 263 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2001).
71. See id. at 1298-1302.
72. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
73. Id. at 118.
74. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
75. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176 (1993).
76. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
77. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
78. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22
(1963); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 196 (D. Mass. 2004).
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federal violations of jus cogens79 norms constituted a waiver of
immunity. 80 The Court determined that a waiver was created, basing its
decision on: (1) the fact that international law created such a waiver; and
(2) recognition that the U.S. ought to avoid legal conflicts with
international obligations. 81 Since Charming Betsy, the Court has
continued to construe Congressional acts to avoid inconsistency with
prior international provisions.82  Unless Congress has indicated
otherwise, courts should consider the doctrine of international comity
when interpreting statutes.83 Thus, courts aim to interpret applicable
provisions in a manner consistent with international obligations.
8 4
In sum, courts follow a prescribed set of rules in their construction of
statutes. Unless the plain language is unambiguous, courts may consider
legislative history in order to ascertain Congressional intent. Courts may
also consider how prior judicial decisions have analyzed the statute at
issue. Throughout this process, courts aim to interpret statutes in
accordance with international law.
III. THE LANHAM ACT PROVIDES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The express language of sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act
aim to give effect to the provisions of international treaties.85 Section
44(i) of the Lanham Act indicates that such treaties logically provide
additional rights beyond those expressly specified in the Act's statutory
text.86 Upon looking beyond the express language of these sections, it
becomes clear that Congress enacted them in order to execute
international agreements as an exercise of the commerce power. 87 Courts
have subsequently applied these relevant Lanham Act provisions in an
79. "Jus cogens" is "[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted and
recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (8th ed. 2004).
80. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 66-67.
81. See id. at 118-21.
82. For a list of relevant cases, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 114 (1987).
83. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996).
84. See Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also United
States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-41 (9th Cir. 1994).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h) (2000).
86. See id. § 1126(i); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp.
684, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
87. See Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 690.
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effort to provide protection for foreign trademark owners, both through
the rights embodied in the Paris Convention 88 and other international
89treaties. In accordance with the Charming Betsy canon, courts interpret
the Lanham Act to comport with international law.90
A. The Plain Language of Sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham
Act Effectuates the Provisions of the Paris Convention
The ordinary meaning of sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham
Act provides foreign trademark owners with Paris Convention rights and
remedies under federal law. 91 The language of the first two provisions
unequivocally affirms that the Lanham Act is designed to incorporate the
provisions of international treaties such as the Paris Convention.92
Although courts have disputed the meaning of section 44(i), several
jurisdictions have held that the plain language of the provision, read in
conjunction with sections 44(b) and (h), indicates that incorporation of
international conventions into the Lanham Act demonstrates
congressional intent to recognize provisions of the Paris Convention as
an integral part of the statute.93
1. Sections 44(b) and (h) State that the Lanham Act Provides Benefits
to Litigants Seeking Protection by Way of a Convention Provision
Two provisions within the Lanham Act speak directly to the benefits
held by foreigners whose countries are fellow signatories to the Paris
Convention. First, section 44(b) provides that any foreign national
whose country of origin is a party to any convention relating to
trademarks to which the U.S. is also a party "shall be entitled to the
benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention.,
94
88. See Grupo Gigante 11, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2004).
89. See, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909, 924 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h)-(i).
92. See id. § 1126(b), (h); Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 689-90.
93. See Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp at 689-90; see also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 283-86 (1952).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b); accord Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1093 n.7 ("As originally enacted, § 44(b) specifically referenced the International Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Union) ....").
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This section codifies international trademark agreements in federal law
by providing certain foreigners with the advantages provided in such
treaties.95 Second, section 44(h) states that any person entitled to the
benefits of section 44(b) "shall be entitled to effective protection against
unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter ... shall be
available so far as they may be appropriate. 96 Section 44(h) guarantees
foreign nationals the same protection against trademark infringement
enjoyed by U.S. citizens, whether such protection emanates from federal
or state law.97 Thus, the ordinary meaning of these two subsections
indicates that Lanham Act rights are extended to effectuate the purposes
of international conventions.98
2. Courts Disagree on Whether the Plain Language of Section 44(i)
Suggests that the Lanham Act Provides Additional Rights Beyond
Those Explicitly Enumerated in the Act's Statutory Text
Courts disagree on whether the plain language of section 44 of the
Lanham Act implements the expansive prohibition against unfair
competition found in the Paris Convention.99 Some courts have stated
that the Paris Convention, although recognized by the Lanham Act, does
not provide substantive rights beyond those specifically enumerated by
Congress. 00 These courts conclude that section 44 extends only existing
Lanham Act and state law protections to foreigners engaged in
commerce in the U.S. 01 Other courts, however, have noted that the
Lanham Act incorporates international agreements and in some cases
incorporates the provisions of such agreements to create a federal body
of unfair competition law that is applicable in cross-border disputes.102
95. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1956).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h).
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981).
99. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 460, 481-82 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting this
disagreement).
100. See, e.g., Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640-41; see also In re Compagnie Generale Mar., 993
F.2d 841, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Nies, C.J., dissenting); Majorica, S.A. v. Majorca Int'l, Ltd., 687 F.
Supp. 92, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
101. See, e.g., Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 640; L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d
649, 652 (3d Cir. 1954).
102. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 688-89 (E.D.
Mich 1996) (holding that a U.S. company may receive Lanham Act and Paris Convention protection
from unfair competition occurring outside of the U.S.); see also Laboratorios Roldan, C. por A. v.
Tex Int'l, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1555, 1568-69 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that a Dominican company
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These latter courts interpret the Lanham Act in a manner dictated by the
statute's underlying purpose of providing rights and remedies stipulated
by prior international conventions. 10 3 Courts have partially justified this
approach by looking to section 44(i), which accords U.S. citizens the
same rights that foreign nationals receive under section 44(b). 10 4 Courts
have interpreted the language of this provision to indicate that Congress
drafted section 44(i) in order to make clear that the incorporation of
international agreements such as the Paris Convention provides
additional rights for U.S. citizens, 10 5 and by extension, those foreigners
whose countries are signatory nations. 10 6 In other words, it would have
been unnecessary for Congress to include section 44(i) in the Lanham
Act unless the incorporation of international treaties entitled Lanham
Act claimants to rights not explicit in the statutory language.'0 7 These
jurisdictions have concluded that the alternative reading of section
44(b)-to require only national treatment-would render section 44(i)
superfluous and thus fail to give full effect to every provision of the
statute. 10
B. Congress Enacted Sections 44(b) and (h) with a Design Toward
Providing Foreign Trademark Owners with Additional Means of
Protection
Congress understood from the outset that the Paris Convention
provided more extensive protection against unfair competition than the
Lanham Act. 10 9 Initially, members of Congress were concerned that
enacting a broad federal prohibition against unfair competition would be
may receive Lanham Act protection from unfair competition).
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000); Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp at 689; Maison Lazard et
Compagnie v. Manfira, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
104. See id. § 1126(i) ("Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as
are granted by this section to persons described in subsection (b) of this section."); Gen. Motors
Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 689; Maison Lazard, 585 F. Supp. at 1289 (holding that section 44 of the Act
provides rights and remedies consistent with unfair competition treaties).
105. Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 689; Maison Lazard, 585 F. Supp at 1289.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Trademarks, supra note 14 ("We have the curious anomaly of this Government giving
by treaty [Paris Convention] and by law with respect to trade-marks and unfair competition to
nationals of foreign governments greater rights than it gives to its own citizens.") (statement of
Edward S. Rogers, Attorney).
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dangerous. 10 However, Congress reversed its position during the
legislative process and ultimately enacted section 44(h) to provide
foreigners with valuable protections.11' Such an about face is consistent
with Congress' belief that it should execute the articles of the Paris
Convention completely.' 12 Congress has the power to regulate foreign
commerce when such activities have a substantial effect on commerce
between the U.S. and foreign nations."' Coupling section 44(h) with
Congress' ability to affect foreign commerce has led to the
determination that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach.1 14 Recent
amendments to sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act also provide
that the relationship between the statute and the Paris Convention should
be left unaffected.
1 15
C. Courts Have Disagreed as to Whether the Lanham Act Protects
Foreigners with Well-Known Marks but Have Read Similar
International Treaties into the Act
Since the inception of the Lanham Act in 1946, U.S. courts have
afforded Lanham Act protection to foreign well-known mark holders by
relying on the language of article 6bis of the Paris Convention."H6 After
the codification of federal trademark law, a New York state court
reaffirmed that foreign well-known mark holders may receive trademark
protection in the U.S." 7 More recently, federal courts have disagreed as
to whether the Lanham Act incorporates article 6bis of the Paris
Convention as a substantive right.' 18 The Ninth Circuit has held that a
110. See id. at 165-68.
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h) (2000); Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 690.
112. See Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp at 690; see also Trademarks, supra note 14.
113. Cf Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,261-62 (2d Cir. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283-86 (1952) (holding that the
Lanham Act was designed to provide courts with expansive powers of jurisdiction, including, in
certain circumstances, extraterritorial activities).
115. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 43 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 5577, 5606
("These amendments will not affect U.S. obligations under the Paris Convention .... ").
116. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6bis; Grupo Gigante I, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th
Cir. 2004); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909,
924 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
117. See Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334-36 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
118. Compare Grupo Gigante II, 391 F.3d at 1094, with Almancenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat
Mkt. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). While the Ninth Circuit holds that foreign
trademark owners may bring a Lanham Act claim under the principles of the well-known marks
doctrine, the Southern District of New York holds that no such substantive right exists under the
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similar international trademark treaty provides substantive Lanham Act
rights for foreign claimants." 9
1. Vaudable Supports the Validity of the Well-Known Marks Doctrine
Following the Codification of Federal Trademark Law
Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.,' 20 a 1959 trial court decision from New
York, strengthened the significance of the well-known marks doctrine as
the first case to apply the well-known marks doctrine after the inception
of the Lanham Act. In Vaudable, a New York restaurant began operating
under the name "Maxim's," the same name as a well-known Parisian
restaurant in operation since 1893.121 The New York restaurant used
similar script for its sign and included other features designed to evoke
the images and expectations that had come to be associated with the elite
French restaurant. 122 The Vaudable court enjoined the marks at issue
from being used in New York because it was unmistakably clear that the
New York establishment aimed to appropriate the goodwill of a
restaurant with international recognition.1 23 It did this in light of the fact
that the marks associated with the Paris Maxim's were well-known, even
though the Parisian restaurant did not register its mark under the Lanham
Act or directly engage in business in the U.S.1 24 Moreover, the Vaudable
court noted that the scope of protection available against unfair
competition had only increased over time as a result of case law and
legislation such as the Lanham Act. 25 Thus, the Vaudable court held
that trademark owners who use their marks exclusively in foreign
countries could on occasion receive sole rights to a particular mark in the
U.S. if the mark meets an ambiguous "well-known" threshold.1
26
language of the Act.
119. See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
121. See id. at 334. The Paris "Maxim's" had been the subject of many articles in periodicals and
mentioned in both movies and television. Id. The court determined that the Parisian restaurant
would be well-known to New York City restaurant-goers. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 335.
124. See id. at 335-36.
125. See id. at 335 ("The trend of the law, both statutory and decisional, has been to extend the
scope of the doctrine of unfair competition .....
126. See id. at 334-35.
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2. Courts Have Recently Disagreed as to Whether the Lanham Act
Incorporates the Well-Known Marks Doctrine as a Statutory Right
Recently, federal courts have reached differing results when litigants
have brought Lanham Act claims arising from the language of article
6bis of the Paris Convention. 127 The Ninth Circuit has held that the well-
known marks doctrine is an existing component of federal trademark law
that may be utilized in limited situations. 128 Conversely, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York has held that article 6bis
cannot provide the basis for a valid claim in federal court because the
plain language of the Lanham Act does not explicitly provide for the
protection of well-known marks. 
129
The Ninth Circuit recently implied that article 6bis of the Paris
Convention provides a substantive right that may be enforced through
section 44 of the Lanham Act. 130 In Grupo Gigante v. Dallo & Co., 3' a
Mexican grocery store chain sued a California grocery store for
infringement of its "Gigante" trademark, relying on the language of both
the Lanham Act and the Paris Convention. 132 After recognizing the well-
known marks doctrine, the court reasoned that, without that doctrine,
territoriality would be completely unqualified and consumer confusion
and fraud would prevail. 133 In its justification of the doctrine, the Grupo
Gigante court echoed some of the language of the Vaudable court.1
34
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit remarked that both commerce and people
frequently cross borders in the twenty-first century and, as a result,
protection of marks necessitates looking beyond national borders. 35
127. Compare Grupo Gigante II, 391 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the rights
outlined under article 6bis may be asserted under section 44(b) of the Lanham Act), with
Almancenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that section 44(b) does not incorporate the language of article 6bis).
128. See Grupo Gigante , 391 F.3d at 1094-98.
129. See Almancenes Exito S.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
130. See Grupo Gigante H, 391 F.3d at 1099.
131. 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
132. Id. at 1092.
133. See id. at 1094.
134. See id. at 1094-95 (noting that even those mark owners who use their marks in other
countries can sometimes gain exclusive rights to the marks in the U.S., if the mark has achieved a
high degree of fame here).
135. See id. at 1094 ("There can be no justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants
into thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back home."); see also Grupo Gigante
S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo Gigante 1), 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(noting that the well-known marks doctrine "recognizes the realities of modem society and business
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The Grupo Gigante court limited the well-known marks doctrine to
comport with the concept of territoriality. 36 In the lower court decision,
the Central District of California interpreted Grupo Gigante's use of the
mark exactly as it would have had Grupo Gigante used the mark not
only in Mexico, but also in another part of the U.S.137 Therefore, the
relevant inquiry became simply whether or not Grupo Gigante had
acquired secondary meaning 38 in the California market. 39 In concert
with early cases discussing the doctrine, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
lower court's interpretation due to concern that such a broad application
of the doctrine would effectively whittle away the concept of
territoriality. 40 Instead, the Ninth Circuit, as the first appellate court to
apply the well-known marks doctrine,'14  created a high threshold for
litigants to meet in order to invoke its protections. 42 The court noted that
the Lanham Act claim brought by the foreign mark holder was
duplicative of the alternative claim brought under article 6bis of the
Paris Convention. 143 Thus, the Grupo Gigante court concluded that the
Lanham Act incorporated article 6bis in light of the fact that the Paris
Convention does not give rise to any federal causes of action or other
substantive rights. 144
by acknowledging the fact that a trademark can be carried to areas far from the actual point of sale
due to advertising and the ambulatory nature of consumers"), vacated, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
2004).
136. See Grupo Gigante 11, 391 F.3d at 1097-98.
137. See Grupo Gigante 1, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (noting that the relevant inquiry was whether
"the mark was sufficiently known to potential customers in the area of the United States where it
seeks protection"). The court did not consider whether the mark actually qualified as "well-known."
138. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (noting that to establish
secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the
product itself).
139. See Grupo Gigante l, 391 F.3d at 1097.
140. See id. at 1097-98.
141. See id. at 1094. For a recent judicial decision that implicitly recognizes the doctrine as a part
of the Lanham Act, see ITC v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(finding that the doctrine may have been asserted by the plaintiff through a Lanham Act claim, but
ultimately declining to reach the issue because the foreign mark, as an initial matter, had not
acquired secondary meaning).
142. See Grupo Gigante 1, 391 F.3d at 1098. The Ninth Circuit created a two-prong test for
litigants to pass in order to receive protection under the doctrine. Id. The moving party must (1)
demonstrate that the mark has developed secondary meaning; and (2) prove that a substantial
percentage of consumers in the relevant American market are familiar with the foreign mark. Id.
143. See id. at 1099.
144. See id.
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In apparent conflict with Grupo Gigante, the Southern District of
New York recently determined that the well-known marks doctrine does
not apply to federal trademark law. 145 In Almancenes Exito S.A. v. El
Gallo Meat Market, Inc.,146 a Colombian retailer brought federal and
state law claims against a grocery store operator in the U.S., alleging
infringement of the "EXITO" trademark. 147 The court found the doctrine
inapplicable to federal law claims because Congress developed the
Lanham Act to handle all federal trademark claims and the statute does
not explicitly include the well-known marks doctrine. 148 The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that the well-known marks doctrine was
a part of the Lanham Act by incorporation of article 6bis of the Paris
Convention. 149 Rather, the district court determined that while the
Lanham Act to some degree incorporated the articles agreed upon in
Paris, the articles did not grant substantive rights beyond those provided
by the plain language of the federal statute. 150 The Almancenes Exito
court distinguished Grupo Gigante as based strictly on policy rather than
statutory grounds. 151 While the court admitted that the well-known
marks doctrine may support state law claims, 152 it concluded that
Congress would need to codify a new provision in the Lanham Act in
order for the doctrine to have effect in federal courts.
15 3
The Almancenes Exito court partially justified its decision by relying
on Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.154 In that case, the
Second Circuit implicitly recognized the well-known marks doctrine,
noting that article 6bis may be implied in certain Lanham Act
provisions. 155 The Second Circuit did not allow the plaintiff to seek
145. See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
146. 381 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
147. See id. at 325-26.
148. See id. at 327-28.
149. See id. at 327.
150. See id. at 328; see also Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
1274, 1278 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (finding that the Paris Convention does not create substantive rights
beyond those independently provided in the Lanham Act).
151. See Almacenes Exito S.A., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
152. See id. at 327.
153. Seeid. at 328.
154. 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
155. See id. at 480 ("Cubatabaco may be correct that Sections 44(b) and (h) [of the Lanham Act]
incorporate Article 6bis and allow foreign entities to acquire U.S. trademark rights in the United
States if their marks are sufficiently famous in the United States before they are used in this
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protection under the doctrine. 156 The decision was ultimately based on an
embargo between the U.S. and Cuba, the plaintiff's country of origin,
which prohibited the plaintiff from acquiring trademark rights in the
U.S. 157 Thus, it was only under the special circumstances of an economic
embargo that the Second Circuit refused to apply the doctrine.1
58
3. The Ninth Circuit Has Determined that Rights Embodied in Other
International Treaties May Be Enforced Through Section 44 of the
Lanham Act
In Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,' 59 the Ninth Circuit determined
that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the
U.S. and Japan could provide a basis for a Japanese corporation to assert
section 44 claims under the Lanham Act in federal court. 60 The foreign
holder of the mark "Godzilla" brought claims against an American
manufacturer of garbage bags that used the name "Bagzilla" in
advertising. 161 The Toho court found that because Japan was a signatory
nation to a trademark treaty with the U.S. that required the U.S. to
provide trademark protection to Japanese nationals that was at least as
favorable as the treatment accorded to American citizens, 162 a reading of
section 44 in conjunction with the treaty at issue required U.S. courts to
provide the Japanese mark holder a federal forum to pursue its claims.
63
Under the court's reasoning, section 44 mandates that federal courts
apply international treaty provisions in order to determine whether
country."). But see Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a
Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 389 n.9 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting) ("[The well-known marks]
doctrine has been applied so seldom... that its viability is uncertain.").
156. See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 481.
157. See id.
158. See id. ("We do not read Article 6bis and Section 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act to require
cancellation of General Cigar's properly registered trademark or an injunction against its use of the
mark in the United States under these circumstances.") (emphasis added).
159. 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
160. See id. at 792-93.
161. See id. at 789-90.
162. See id. at 792-93 ("The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, art. X, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2071, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, requires the United States to
accord Japanese nationals and companies treatment 'with respect to rights in trade marks. . .' that is
at least as favorable as (1) the treatment accorded nationals and companies of the United States and
(2) that accorded to the nationals and companies of most favored nations.").
163. See id.
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federal jurisdiction exists for the foreign mark holder. 164 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that an international treaty could provide a foreign mark
holder with substantive Lanham Act rights under section 44. 165
D. Courts Interpret the Lanham Act in a Manner that Comports
Federal Law with International Obligations
When the plain language of the Lanham Act is susceptible to differing
interpretations, courts aim to construe the statute in harmony with
international law. 166 The Paris Convention is a "law of nations," or
customary international law, and therefore considered an international
agreement for the purposes of the Charming Betsy canon. 167 The
ratification of the Paris Convention predates the Lanham Act, and
section 44 of the Lanham Act provides federal rights coextensive with
the provisions of the Paris Convention. 168 The Federal Circuit recently
employed the Charming Betsy canon in its interpretation of section 44 of
the Lanham Act and its connection to the Paris Convention.' 69 The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, an administrative court, has also
interpreted section 44 use requirements in an effort to promote
consistency between the Lanham Act and the Paris Convention, finding
that in instances of ambiguity the Board must apply the federal statute by
fully recognizing the international provisions outlined in the Paris
Convention. 70 Thus, courts harmonize the Lanham Act with the Paris
Convention in order to maintain consistency with international
trademark rights. '7'
In sum, the plain language of sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the
Lanham Act states that claimants under the statute may receive the
benefits necessary to give effect to provisions of international treaties.
The Lanham Act's legislative history indicates that the Act was designed
164. See id. at 792-93; see also Litton Sys., Inc. v. Ssangyong Cement Indus. Co., No. 96-1034,
1997 WL 59360, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 1997).
165. See Toho, 645 F.2d at 792-93.
166. See, e.g., In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
167. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 481 (2d Cir. 2005).
168. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
sections 44(h) and (i) of the Lanham Act provide federal causes of action to the extent that the
provisions of the Paris Convention create such rights).
169. See Rath, 402 F.3d at 1211.
170. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909,
924 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
171. See Rath, 402 F.3d at 1211; see also Crocker Nat 'l Bank, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 924.
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to have extraterritorial reach, and that the articles of the Paris
Convention should be fully executed. Judicial decisions have since
recognized that article 6bis, as well as the provisions of other
international treaties, should be understood as incorporated into the
Lanham Act. The statute, therefore, has continued to develop with great
emphasis on synchronicity with international law.
IV. COURTS SHOULD VIEW THE LANHAM ACT AS
INCORPORATING THE WELL-KNOWN MARKS DOCTRINE
Courts should treat the Lanham Act as providing foreign well-known
mark holders with remedies under federal law when their trademarks are
infringed in the U.S. The plain language of sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of
the Lanham Act mandates that federal trademark law give full effect to
article 6bis of the Paris Convention. 172 The Lanham Act's legislative
history indicates that courts should completely execute the protections
afforded by article 6bis of the Paris Convention.173 Congress thus clearly
sought to incorporate the articles of the Paris Convention in the
codification of federal trademark law. 174 Courts have accordingly held or
implied that Lanham Act claimants may assert the well-known marks
doctrine as a means of redress. 175 The conclusion that the Lanham Act
adopted article 6bis is buttressed by the principle that trademark law,
particularly in instances of uncertainty, should be interpreted in harmony
with international law principles. 1
76
A. The Plain Language of Sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham
Act Reveals that the Paris Convention 's Well-Known Marks
Doctrine Is a Part of Federal Trademark Law
A proper interpretation of the ordinary meaning of sections 44(b), (h),
and (i) of the Lanham Act demonstrates that article 6bis of the Paris
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h)-(i) (2000).
173. See Trademarks, supra note 14; see also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946), as reprinted in
1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1276.
174. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. lgnacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 690 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
175. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 480 (2d Cir. 2005); Grupo
Gigante 11, 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004); ITC v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Grupo Gigante 1, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 391
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
176. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 100-515, at 5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 5577, 5581.
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Convention is an integrated part of federal trademark law. Unless
confusion is evident from the text, the ordinary meaning of statutory
language provides the complete means of interpretation for courts.
1 77
Sections 44(b) and (h) unequivocally enable foreigners to receive
protection from unfair competition in the U.S. 78 Section 44(b) explicitly
codifies the provisions of international conventions into the very fabric
of the Lanham Act. 17 9 It is also significant to note that the original
rendering of section 44(b) specifically referenced the Paris
Convention.18 0 In addition, the plain language of section 44(i) reinforces
the notion that foreign nationals must receive the same rights as U.S.
citizens under section 44(b).181 Several jurisdictions have determined
that the language of section 44(i) could only have been enacted in order
to afford nationals of Paris Convention member nations additional rights
beyond those explicit in the Lanham Act. 82 Therefore, the ordinary
meaning of section 44(i) reveals congressional intent to entitle Lanham
Act claimants to the rights embodied in international treaties. 83 If every
clause and word within the statutory text is to be given full effect, 8 4 then
the Lanham Act must provide claimants with the power to invoke any
convention provision to which the U.S. is a party.' 85 Thus, because the
U.S. is a member nation of the Paris Convention, article 6bis of that
convention must be understood to create a valid cause of action for
Lanham Act litigants whose countries are signatories to the international
treaty.
177. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (h) (2000).
179. See id. § 1126(b) ("Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention ... to
which the United States is also a party ... shall be entitled to the benefits of this section... to the
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention .... ").
180. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093 n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(i).
182. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. lgnacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 689 (E.D. Mich.
1996); see also Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp.
1286, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
183. See Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp at 689.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b).
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B. The Legislative History of Sections 44(b) and (h) Evidence
Congressional Intent to Recognize the Articles of the Paris
Convention as a Part of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act's legislative history shows that Congress intended
sections 44(b) and (h) to give full effect to the provisions of the Paris
Convention. 186 Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, lawmakers were
aware of the greater rights provided by the Paris Convention.1
81
Although initially skeptical of codifying such broad rights, 188 Congress
created section 44(h) in order to give full effect to the provisions of the
Paris Convention. 189 Even with recent amendments to the Lanham Act,
Congress continues to emphasize that the interrelationship between
federal law and the Paris Convention should not be altered. 90 Congress,
therefore, was aware of the more expansive rights contained in the
international convention and intended to endorse such rights through the
provisions of section 44.191
C. Courts Have Determined that International Conventions Provide
Additional Rights and Remedies to Litigants by Way of Section 44
of the Lanham Act
Courts that find ambiguity within section 44 of the Lanham Act may
also look to judicial and administrative interpretations of the statute to
assist in their analyses. 192 In so doing, courts have recognized that the
Lanham Act, since its inception, has served to broaden the scope of
unfair competition law immensely. 193 The Ninth Circuit recently
affirmed that foreign trademark owners may bring Lanham Act claims
based entirely on article 6bis of the Paris Convention.1 94 The Grupo
Gigante court stressed that the Paris Convention is not self-executing
186. See Trademarks, supra note 14; see also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946), as reprinted in
1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1274-78.
187. See Trademarks, supra note 14.
188. See id. at 165-68.
189. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. lgnacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 690 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
190. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 5577, 5581.
191. See Gen. Motors Corp., 948 F. Supp at 690.
192. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2003).
193. See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
194. See Grupo Gigante 11, 391 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004).
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and thus does not generate particular rights in federal courts.
195
Therefore, protection for foreign well-known marks emanates from
federal law.
Although the Southern District of New York declined to recognize the
well-known marks doctrine absent an explicit amendment to the Lanham
Act, 196 it did not properly construe the plain meaning of section 44(b).
Section 44(b) aims to give effect to article 6bis of the Paris
Convention. 197 Therefore, the mere fact that the Lanham Act does not
spell out the well-known marks doctrine in its text is irrelevant because
section 44(b) plainly offers Lanham Act protection when rights are
asserted under international trademark conventions. 98 Even though the
Southern District of New York ultimately found conflict between
Congress' specified bases for federal trademark claims and section
44(b), an analysis of relevant legislative history confirms the proper
conclusion. 99 Moreover, the court declined to follow the Second
Circuit's suggestion that the well-known marks doctrine may be an
integral part of sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act outside of a
case involving the Cuban embargo. 200 Based on language embedded in
the decision, it seems probable that, had the embargo been set aside, the
Second Circuit would have granted relief under the well-known marks
doctrine through a Lanham Act claim.20 1 Consequently, the refusal of the
Southern District of New York to validate the well-known marks
doctrine provides an unpersuasive construction of federal trademark law.
The Ninth Circuit's recognition that other international treaties also
provide additional substantive rights under section 44(b) of the Lanham
Act further supports the conclusion that the Lanham Act incorporates
195. Seeid. at I100.
196. See Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
198. See id.
199. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 690 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
200. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 480-81 (2d Cir. 2005).
201. See id. ("Cubatabaco may be correct that Sections 44(b) and (h) incorporate Article 6bis and
allow foreign entities to acquire U.S. trademark rights in the United States if their marks are
sufficiently famous in the United States before they are used in this country .... However, we need
not decide that broad question here because even assuming that the famous marks doctrine is
otherwise viable and applicable, the embargo bars Cubatabaco from acquiring property rights in the
U.S. COHIBA mark through the doctrine.").
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article 6bis of the Paris Convention into federal law.2 °2 The Toho court
determined that section 44 requires courts to consider provisions of
international law when deciding whether a foreign trademark owner may
assert a Lanham Act claim. 20 3 Moreover, the basic premise of the
trademark treaty at issue in Toho, reciprocal treatment between Japan
and the U.S.,20 4 is identical to the reciprocal treatment mandated by the
205Paris Convention. In this crucial regard, the international agreements
are indistinguishable. 0 6 Thus, any claim brought under section 44(b)
necessitates careful consideration of relevant international provisions
such as the well-known marks doctrine.
D. Under the Charming Betsy Canon, Courts Should Construe the
Lanham Act in Harmony with International Law
The Charming Betsy canon of construction mandates that courts
interpret the Lanham Act in accordance with the articles of the Paris
Convention.20 7 Section 44(b) of the Lanham Act aims to give effect to all
provisions of international trademark conventions.0 8 Since the language
of the statute serves to reinforce rather than contradict the provisions of
the Paris Convention, courts should construe relevant portions of the
Lanham Act in a manner consistent with those rights enumerated in
international treaties in order to comply with the Charming Betsy
canon. 20 9 Both federal and administrative courts have utilized this canon
to harmonize section 44 of the Lanham Act with the Paris Convention.210
Thus, if a court finds section 44 to contain an ambiguity, it should avoid
construing the statute in any manner that fails to give full effect to
international provisions such as the well-known marks doctrine.211
202. See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792-93 (9tb Cir. 1981).
203. See id.
204. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. X, Apr. 2, 1953, 4
U.S.T. 2063, 2071.
205. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 2.
206. Compare id., with Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. X, Apr.
2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2071.
207. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909,
924 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2000).
209. Cf Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
210. See In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Crocker Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 924.
211. See Crocker Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 924.
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In sum, federal courts should interpret section 44(b) of the Lanham
Act as codifying article 6bis of the Paris Convention. The plain language
of sections 44(b), (h), and (i), read in concert, provides Lanham Act
claimants with additional rights founded upon the provisions of
international conventions. Examination of legislative history and prior
judicial considerations of the statute also reveals that international
conventions offer substantive rights and a means of redress under the
Lanham Act. Moreover, under the Charming Betsy canon, the Lanham
Act must be interpreted in accordance with international law.
Consequently, a proper interpretation of the Lanham Act incorporates
article 6bis of the Paris Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
The plain language, legislative history, and prior considerations of the
Lanham Act all require courts to recognize the well-known marks
doctrine as an integrated part of the Lanham Act. Congress would not
have enacted sections 44(b), (h), and (i) of the Lanham Act unless it
intended additional rights founded upon international conventions to be
made available to Lanham Act claimants. Moreover, proper
interpretation of the Lanham Act in accordance with relevant
international conventions would reduce inconsistencies between U.S.
and international laws, thereby promoting innovation and global trade
212
while allowing all signatory nations to develop industries in a manner
that strengthens the ability of their domestic mark holders to receive
valuable trademark protection in the U.S. Unless courts consider article
6bis of the Paris Convention and other similar international accords to be
incorporated in the Lanham Act, courts will improperly render the
relevant statutory provisions obsolete. Such a result would be antithetical
to prescribed notions of statutory construction.
212. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Essay: The Integration of International and Domestic
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307, 308-10 (2000).
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